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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J
Case No. 940387-CA

vs.

\
i
J

JUAN ANTHONY PORTILLO,

ii

Priority N o . 2

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Defendant/Appellant.

J

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS PLAIN ERROR FOR A JUDGE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED
The State argues that the trial court committed no e r r o r —
obvious or o t h e r w i s e — i n instructing and questioning the jury
during voir dire on the punishment mandated by law for each
charge because the trial court's "venire voir dire... properly
afforded the parties an opportunity to explore whether any venire
member held a particular penalty bias and, consequently, to
ensure that the jury impaneled could reach an impartial decision
unencumbered by irrelevant concerns over the applicable
penalities" (Br. of Appellee at 8, 1 1 - 1 3 ) . l

during voir dire the trial court informed the jury panel of
the penalty mandated by law for each count (R. 161 at 15-17) and
then questioned the venire panel whether "anyone believes that the
punishment fixed by law is too severe or too light for the offense
charged" (R. 161 at 3 4 ) .

1
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Portillo, however, asserts that it was, in fact, obvious
error for the trial court to instruct and question the venire
panel with respect to penalty.

Where there is no statutory

provision mandating a jury role in penalty determination, both
Utah and federal courts have stated repeatedly during the past
twenty-years that punishment is the exclusive perogative of the
trial court and should not be considered by the jury in rendering
a verdict of guilt or innocence.2
In this case the jury had no statutory role in penalty
determination.

The possible penalties which could be imposed in

2

Utah cases include: State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1202-03
(Utah 1989)(Possible punishment is not a proper matter for jury
consideration because a determination of guilt or innocence
shouldn't be swayed by a jury's feelings towards a defendant
because of an anticipated sentence); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
291, 296 (Utah 1988) (Jury is ordinarily not informed of the
punishment and the length of a possible sentence is generally
thought to be irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence); Salt
Lake City v. Tuero,745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987) ("Sentencing is
the perogative of the trial court... and the jury has no function
in the process.
To question the jury panel concerning their
opinions of a potential sentence may invite confusion on the jury's
part as to their proper role in the trial").
Federal cases are: Shannon v. United States,
U.S.
,
114 S.Ct. 2419, 2424 (1994)(The trial court holds the authority to
impose sentences once the jury has rendered a guilty verdict and if
jurors are provided with sentencing information they are invited to
"ponder matters that are not within their province", they will be
distracted from their fact finding obligation, and their will be a
strong liklihood of confusion); Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S.
35, 40 (1975) (Jury should reach its verdict "without regard to
what sentence might be imposed"); United States v. McCracken, 488
F.2d 406, 424 (5th Cir. 1974) (To inform the jury of punishment
"draws the attention of the jury away from their chief function as
sole judges of the facts, opens the door to compromise verdicts"
and a jury's consideration of the penalty is prejudicial error).
Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971) (It is
error to tell the jury about the consequences of a certain
verdict).
2
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this case are irrelevant to the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence arising from their fact-finding function.

Therefore,

it was obvious error in this case for the trial court to instruct
the jury on the penalties fixed by law for each count, and to
question the panel with respect to their opinions about the
mandated punishments, because the jury had no function in the
sentencing process.
Because the trial court's error was obvious, under the plain
error or manifest injustice standard, it wil result in reversal
if it was prejudicial.
(Utah 1989).

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122

The State argues that any prejudice which may have

resulted from the trial court's error was cured by the
instruction given by the court to the impaneled jury that they
shouldn't consider nor discuss the subject of penalty and that
possible punishment for the crimes charged mustn't affect their
decision as to Portillo's guilt or innocence (R. 78, Br. of
Appellee at 14-15).
However, it is clear from the question submitted by the jury
during deliberation (R. 106), and from the fact that the jury
reached a verdict almost immediately after the question was
answered (R. 180), that the jury failed to heed the trial court's
subsequent instruction to "disregard punishment."

Therefore, the

trial court's erroneous penalty instructions constituted
prejudicial error, which is a sufficient basis to warrant
reversal of Portillo's conviction.

3
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY INCLUDING IN ITS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY THAT A SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT OF
COUNTS II AND III IS THAT THESE VIOLATIONS ARE A SECOND
OR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF THE SAME STATUTE
In Appellant's brief, Portillo argued that the trial court
committed two obvious and prejudicial errors in its Jury
Instructions 3-5, which resulted in a manifest injustice. The
first of these errors is the trial court's use of the term
"violation" rather than the statutory term "conviction."
However, Portillo concedes that State v. Hunt, 277 Utah Adv. Rep.
30 (Utah 1995), renders harmless any error by the trial court's
use of the word "violation" rather than "conviction" in Jury
Instructions 3-5 (R. 100-102).
The second obvious and prejudicial error alleged by Portillo
concerns the criminal elements of Counts I-III set forth in Jury
Instructions 3-5. Counts I-III are all charges of Distribution
of Marijuana in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-378(a)(ii).

While count I was charged as a third degree felony,

counts II and III were charged as second degree felonies as
"second or subsequent convictions" under Utah Code Annotated §
58-37-8(b)(ii).
Jury Instructions 4-5 (counts II and III) add as a seventh
essential element:

"That this distribution was a second or

subsequent violation occurring after a previous violation of the
same statute" (R. 100-101).

Portillo asserts that based upon the

plain language of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and

4
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(l)(b)(ii), whether or not a charge is a "second or subsequent
conviction" is not a substantive element of the crime, but a
sentencing enhancement.
Subsection (l)(a)(ii) sets out the substantive elements of
counts I-III:

it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and

intentionally distribute or arrange to distribute a controlled
substance.

On the other hand, subsection (l)(b) sets forth the

penalty for a violation of subsection (l)(a):

"Any person

convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:

(ii)

... marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a second degree felony."
8(l)(b)(ii).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

In Allison v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763

P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court declared:
where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a
statute should be construed according to its plain
language.
Therefore, based upon the plain statutory language of Utah Code
Annotated §§ 58-37-8(a)(ii) and (b)(ii), Portillo asserts that
the trial court committed obvious error in instructing the jury
that a substantive element of counts II and III is "That this
distribution was a second or subsequent violation occurring after
a previous violation of the same statute" (R. 100-101).
Moreover, Portillo asserts that such error in Jury
Instructions 4-5 was prejudicial, it resulted in a manifest
injustice, and it deprived Portillo of a reasonable liklihood of
5
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a more favorable result, because the instructions as written
prevented each charge from being evaluated individually on the
evidence presented at trial as required by law.

The language of

Instructions 4-5 required the jury to make either an all or
nothing finding of guilt, i.e., if the jury did not convict
Portillo of Count I then it could not convict him of Counts II or
III which, according to the given instructions, required a
finding of a second or subsequent violation.
During deliberation, the jury submitted a written question
to the trial court which stated:

"The 3rd charge, instruction

#5, element #7 refers to this charge as a subsequent violation.
If count one and count two are 'not guilty,' can a guilty verdict
be given for count 3" (R. 106). Fifteen minutes after receipt of
the court's "no" answer the jury reached a verdict of "guilty" to
counts I-III (R. 180). The question, coupled with the fact that
the jury reached a verdict almost immediately after the question
was answered, clearly demonstrates that the jury was pondering a
"not guilty" verdict for Counts I and II, but were swayed from
such a more favorable result by the language of Jury Instructions
4-5 which required a finding of guilt under Count I before a
finding of guilt could be made under Count II and III.3

3

In Appellant's brief, Portillo argues that the evidence
produced at trial with respect to counts I and II was insufficient
as compared to count III, where a search warrant was executed on
Portillo's residence following the controlled buy and drugs and the
defendant were both found in the residence (Br. of Appellant at 2425).
6
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The State argues that error, if any, was favorable to
Portillo because it required "the jury to find that counts II and
III constituted second or subsequent violations of the drug
statute before it could convict on either count, the trial court
essentially required the jury to find more elements than actually
required" (Br. of Appellee at 25).

The State further asserts

that if "the jury had been instructed as now requested by
defendant... defendant ran the risk of being convicted for counts
II and III, regardless of the jury's decision to convict or not
convict for count I.

In short, such an instruction would have

made it even more likely that defendant would be convicted on all
three counts (Br. of Appellee at 25-26).
However, Portillo argues that he was in fact—in spite of
the State's assertion of favorable error—convicted of counts I,
II and III.

In addition, had the jury felt that Portillo was

guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" with respect to count I, there
would have been no need to question the court as they did with
respect to the effect of "instruction #5, element #7" (R. 106)
because the answer would not have mattered—nor would the
question have arised.

Moreover, the jury's question also refered

to count II in terms of a "not guilty" verdict (R. 106), which
suggests that the jury must also have had reasonable doubt as to
the State's proof of that charge.
Therefore, absent the erroneous language in Instructions 45, there was a reasonable liklihood that Portillo would have been
acquitted of counts I and II. This is where the real prejudice

7
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or manifest injustice lies:

Had Portillo been acquitted of

counts I and II, count III would have been a third degree felony
because there would have been no prior convictions.

As a result,

Portillo would have been convicted of three third degree felonies
and a class B misdemeanor.

Instead, because of the erroroneous

instructions, Portillo was convicted of two second degree
felonies, three third degree felonies, and a class B misdemeanor.
POINT III
THE ERRORS COMMITTED AT TRIAL
CUMULATIVELY PREJUDICED PORTILLO
If the errors committed at trial—including those argued
supra—are found by this Court to be harmless individually,
Portillo requests that this Court consider if they were
cumulatively harmful.

"'Cumulative error' refers to a number of

error's which prejudice [a] defendant's right to a fair trial."
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986)).
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court will reverse
only if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines
our confidence. . . that a fair trial was had."

Whitehead v.

American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990).
However, "[i]n assessing a claim of cumulative error, [this Court
will] consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors
we assume may have occurred."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100, 114 (Utah 1993).
Portillo, as argued supra, asserts that the trial court
committed two obvious errors at trial.

One, the trial court

8
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,

instructed and questioned the jury with respect to punishment;
and two, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a
substantive element of counts II and III was "That this
distribution was a second or subsequent violation occurring after
a previous violation of the same statute,"

Portillo asserts that

these errors were individually prejudicial to him.

Moreover, he

argues that when the effect of these errors is viewed
cumulatively, this Court's confidence in the fairness of
Portillo's trial should be sufficiently undermined to warrant
reversal.
The trial court's instructing and questioning the jury about
the possible penalties which could attach to the charges invited
the jury, throughout trial, to "ponder matters that are not
within their province."
2419, 2424 (1994).

Shannon v. United States, 114 S.Ct.

The jury's knowledge of the penalty also gave

a weightier importance to a finding of guilt under Count III
because of its more severe punishment.
This error particularly prejudiced Portillo when it is
coupled with the erroroneous seventh element in Jury Instructions
4-5.

The jury—which by the wording of the submitted question

was clearly pondering a "not guilty" verdict for Counts I and II
due to an insufficiency of evidence, particularly with respect to
identification—was left with the choice of convicting Portillo
of either all or none of the first three charges.

The fact that

the jury had been instructed by the court as to the punishment

9
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also clearly prejudiced the potentiality of a "not guiltyverdict on Counts I and II.
As a result of these errors, and the cumulative harm and
prejudiced which resulted, Portillo requests that this Court
vacate his convictions on grounds that the Court's confidence in
the fairness of the trial is undermined.
POINT IV
PORTILLO WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Portillo asserts that the position he takes in Point V of
Appellant's brief is correct and should be adopted by this Court.
Namely, that this court should conclude as a matter of law that,
based upon the obvious and prejudicial errors in the record to
which no objections were made, Portillo was denied the effective
assistance of counsel mandated by both the Utah and United States
constitutions.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the manifest injustice which resulted from the
obvious and prejudicial errors set forth above and in Appellant's
brief, this court should vacate Portillo's conviction and remand
the case for a new trial.
DATED this /Q

day of January, 1996.

'7k.

Margar^ P. Lindsay
'
Attorney for Portillo [/'
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